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Abstract:  
Some multi-species fisheries are characterised by production jointness in the sense that several species 
are caught through a joint production process (literally in the same haul of the net). Other multi-species 
fisheries (so called purse seine fisheries) are specialized in the sense that species are targeted 
individually and by-catch is negligible, but over the fishing season the same boat chooses to target 
several species with varying intensity which also results in a sort of jointness. Both types of fisheries 
are typically modelled using standard multi-input multi-output profit function forms (e.g. translog, 
normalized quadratic). In this paper we argue that jointness in the latter, essentially separable fishery is 
caused by allocation of fishing days input among harvested species. We developed a structural model of 
a multi-species fishery where the allocation of fishing days input causes production jointness. We 
estimate the model for the Norwegian purse seine fishery and find that it is characterised by non-
jointness, while estimations for this fishery using the standard multi-input multi-output profit function 
imply jointness.  
 
JEL classification: Q22; C51 
Key words: Production jointness, multi-species fisheries, structural modeling 
 
1. Introduction 
Fishing industries characterized by multi-species harvesting have been studied extensively in the 
fisheries economics literature, and the investigation of production jointness has been a major area of 
interest. Both trawl fisheries (see e.g. Squires (1987a, 1987b, 1987c) and Alam, Ishak and Squires 
(2002) and purse seine fisheries, (see e.g. Campbell and Nicholl 1995). Asche, Gordon and Jensen 
(2007) and Ekerhovd (2007)) are generally found to be characterised by jointness. This can have 
important implications for fisheries regulation since jointness may imply spill-over’s between harvests 
of the different species undertaken by the industry.  
All the studies cited above use the multi-input multi-output profit function approach 
using standard forms (e.g. translog, normalized quadratic). However, whereas trawl production is joint 
in the sense that several species are caught in the same production process, the type of jointness that  FOI Working Paper 2010/8   
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may arise in a purse seine fishery has a different structure. Purse seine fishers specifically target 
individual species, and by-catch is typically negligible (Jensen (2002)).Although different species are 
caught in separate production processes over the fishing season, the same boat may choose to target 
several species with varying intensity, which in turn may result in the annual harvests of the different 
species being characterised by jointness. This is our point of departure.   
In the following we develop a structural model of a purse seine fishery. In this model, 
production jointness between different basically separate fisheries comes about through the mechanism 
of allocating fishing day input. If the vessel has idle time in harbour (not used for maintenance, rigging 
etc.), input of fishing days is not restricted. In this case there is no production jointness because fishing 
day input to a given fishery can be increased without reducing input to other fisheries by reducing idle 
harbour time. If, on the other hand, there is no idle harbour time and all vessel time is allocated either to 
fishing or maintenance, etc., jointness may occur. This foundation provides a framework for 
understanding and empirically modelling the interactions between different fisheries undertaken by 
such a purse seine fishing industry. We also derive a number of constraints implied by the theoretical 
model that can be empirically tested. As an example, we apply the model to the Norwegian purse seine 
fishery and find that this fishery is characterised by non-jointness.   When estimating a model of this 
fishery based on the standard multi-input multi-output profit function we find evidence of production 
jointness as have prior studies of this fishery using the standard model (Asche, Gordon and Jensen 
(2007) and Ekerhovd (2007)). Thus it seems that basing empirical models on the structural foundation 
we propose can seemingly have important implications for the results.  
Though fishing days input is seldom included in estimated fishery models, Dupont 
(1991) is a notable (and in our context important) exception. Dupont develops and estimates a model of 
single species harvesting constrained by quotas on fishing days (and other input) with the purpose of 
comparing efficiency of different types of input regulation. Though with a different focus and in a 
single species framework the resulting empirical model estimated by Dupont has much the same 
structure as the model we estimate here. Essentially we extend the fishing days constrained profit 
function developed by Dupont to the multi-output situation and develop the underlying theoretical 
foundation for applying it to output-regulated multi-species purse seine fisheries.   FOI Working Paper 2010/8   
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We take outset in the fixed but allocatable land-input setup developed in agricultural 
economics for modelling land constrained multi-crop farming (see e.g. Moore and Negri (1992) and 
Moore, Gollehon and Carey (1994) for an early application). The multi-crop farm production model lets 
each crop production process be completely separable from the others with all inputs available at fixed 
prices except for land which the farmer only has in a fixed amount. Though fixed in its total quantity, 
land is allocatable between crops and so jointness is created through this fixed but allocatable input. 
This basic production set up resembles that of a fisherman allocating fishing days between specialized 
fisheries. However, specialized multispecies fisheries production differs from agricultural crop 
production in several ways. First of all, in most fisheries one or more species are subject to some form 
of quota regulation. Second, the total number of fishing days may to some extent be adjustable in the 
short run by reallocating vessel time for maintenance, rigging etc. Finally, fishing days may not always 
be allocated freely between species. Fishing of some species is highly seasonal so that the fisherman 
may be constrained as to how he can reallocate fishing days between different fisheries (for example 
fishing days cannot be reallocated directly from a fishery whose season is in the winter months to a 
fishery with a summer season). 
In the next section we develop the theoretical model and clarify its underlying 
assumptions. In section 3 we derive a number of testable implications and other useful results implied 
by our model. In section 4 we present our empirical case and data. In section 5 we develop and estimate 
our empirical model and present results, while section 6 concludes.     
 
 
2. The theoretical model 
In this section we develop a model of a purse seine net fishery where the mechanism casing jointness 
between the different basically separable fisheries undertaken by the industry is the allocation of fishing 
days. We then make explicit how the vessel time allocation mechanism causes jointness and discuss the 
key assumptions underlying the model.  
  FOI Working Paper 2010/8   
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The fishing vessel is a fixed capital input (fixed in the short run) in principle available 365 days a year. 
However, there are periods where vessels are not at sea due to maintenance, rigging etc., and so the 
total number of fishing days allocated is typically lower. Underlying these allocations of time are 
decisions where the fisherman weighs costs of quicker maintenance and rigging against the gains from 
having more fishing days at sea. This suggests that even though vessel capital is fixed in the short run, 
the number of fishing days may be variable in the and found as an integrated part of the fisherman’s 
optimisation problem.   
We characterize the production function describing the harvest of separately targeted 
species as a two-step process. In the first step the profit maximising fisherman allocates vessel time 
between ‘maintenance’ and a number of separate single species fisheries. In the second step other inputs 
are combined with the allocated vessel time to produce fish of the targeted type and needed 
maintenance.  
In the second step, when the fisherman has allocated a certain amount of vessel time  i d  
to a specific fishery i, he faces a time dependant production function (where t is a specific point in time 
during the one-year fishing season): 
(, )
tt
ii i yf x t = % %%       ( 1 )  
 
Thus, if the fisherman at time t has allocated his vessel to fishery i and invests other inputs at a rate of 
t
i x % per unit of time (where  i x % is a vector of n other input rates) he catches species i at a rate of 
t
i y %  per 
unit of time. We assume that these fisheries are distinct single species fisheries separated geographically 
or in time, and that there is no by-catch
2.  Given market prices for other input  1 ( ,..., ,..., ) in rr rr = and 
fish output  1 ( ,..., ,..., ) iq pp p p = standard convexity conditions (Chambers, 1988) ensure the existence 
of corresponding dual profit functions: 
 
  (, , )    
t
ii pr t π %       ( 2 )  
                                                 
2 As noted in the introduction by catch is typically negligible and often discarded in purse seine fisheries, Jensen 
(2002).   FOI Working Paper 2010/8   




i π % is the rate of profit at time t.  For most species the fishing season is shorter than 365 days 
implying that the out of season profit rate is low. Onset of the fishing season implies rising profit rates 
as t moves into the season with the profit rate reaching a maximum and then falling again toward the 
end of the season. Assuming a well behaved profit rate function with a single maximum during the year, 
the fisherman’s problem is to decide when to start fishing and when to stop, given the amount of vessel 
time (fishing days) allocated to the species, i.e.: 
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Given the well behaved profit rate function start and stop dates are set so that the time constraint is 
binding and so that start and stop dates have the same profit rate. Letting 
** () , () start t stop t td td  denote the 
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Thus, when there are no other constraints then the allocated vessel time for fishery of a species the 
result of profit maximisation may be described by a conditional profit function with a corresponding 
production function of the dual problem:  
 
(,) ii i i y fxd =     ( 5 )  
 
where  i x   is the vector of variable inputs and  i d  is the number of fishing days allocated to 
production/catch of species i, and i y  is the resulting catch. Except for being connected by the allocation 
of vessel time these fisheries are separable.  FOI Working Paper 2010/8   
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We must also allow for the fact that some targeted species are subject to quota regulation 
implying added constraints of the form: 
 
     for  1,... ii yy i h q ≤= +      ( 6 )  
 
So that the first h species are unregulated and described by profit functions (4) while the remaining are 
output quota regulated. We assume quotas to be binding so that equality applies, and corresponding to 
(4) we can derive   
 dual cost functions conditional on allocated vessel time  i d : 
 
( , , )    for  1,... ii i Cyr d i h q =+      (7) 
 
for the remaining constrained outputs.  
Finally we assume that the timing of maintenance is flexible so that there is no ‘season’ 
variation in maintenance costs. However, we will allow for the possibility of substitution between total 
maintenance costs and total vessel time allocated to maintenance. Thus, allocating  less time to 
maintenance increases maintenance costs, e.g. because of overtime payment or the extra costs of 
postponing needed maintenance in the form of extra depreciation or more expensive maintenance later. 
Let 
 
 () mm m CC d =      ( 8 )  
 
be the functional relationship between maintenance costs  m C and vessel time  m d  (measured in days) 
allocated to maintenance. Note that the model allows for the situation where there is little short run 
flexibility in the time allocation to maintenance (i.e. where fishing days actually are a quasi fixed input). 
This will be the case if the  (.) m C function is steep ( /0 mm dC dd  ).   FOI Working Paper 2010/8   
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  We now turn to the first step of the fisherman’s maximisation problem. Barring other 








+≤ ∑ ), the fishermen’s overall maximisation 
problem can be formulated as allocating vessel time to the profit and cost functions (4), (7) and (8), 
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Here  λ  is the shadow price of vessel time originating from the overall time constraint 
(i.e. the marginal profit that could be reaped by allocating an extra unit of vessel time to the most 
profitable alternative task). If the time constraint is binding, the shadow price of vessel time will be 
positive ( 0 λ > ) while if it is not binding, the shadow price will be zero ( 0 λ = ). This is the 
fisherman’s maximisation problem from which we will derive estimable output supply and input 
demand equations as well as parameter restrictions that can be used to test the model. The model is 
illustrated in the top graph of figure 1 were we have species profit rate    
t
i π %  up the y-axis and time t 
out the x-axis. The illustrated fishery targets three species (A, B and C) where the curves labelled A, B 
and C are their respective profit rates as functions of time t (corresponding to (2)). The horizontal 
punctured line is the marginal savings in maintenance costs resulting from increasing time allocation to 
                                                 
3 We also assume an interior solution so that none of the non negativity constraints are binding (i.e 
. 1 0, 0,..., 0 mq dd d >> > .  FOI Working Paper 2010/8   
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maintenance in optimum (i.e.  / mm dC dd − ). Since maintenance costs are not affected by the timing of 
vessel maintenance, the same marginal cost savings apply over the entire season (i.e. no seasonal 
variation) and this is then equal to the shadow cost of vessel time. The optimal timing of in harbour 
maintenance is the two maintenance periods indicated below the graph. This is optimal because profit 
rates from fishing in these periods are below the marginal maintenance costs saved from allocating time 
to maintenance. During the remaining time, the vessel is allocated to each of the three indicated 
fisheries because profit rates of the respective fisheries are larger than the alternative marginal savings 
of allocating vessel time to maintenance. 
Intuitively if the shadow price falls to zero then no maintenance costs are saved by 
allocating more vessel time to in harbour maintenance. In this situation the vessel has idle time in 
harbour where no maintenance is performed. In this case the different fisheries are separable and there 
is no production jointness because the fisherman can allocate more time to one fishery without reducing 
vessel time to other fisheries or maintenance by reducing idle harbour time. 
If on the other hand the shadow price is positive, this implies that there is no idle harbour 
time so that all vessel time is allocated to a profitable task (either profitable fishing or cost saving in 
harbour maintenance time) in which case production jointness may occur. However, even when the 
shadow price of vessel time is positive, this mechanism of jointness may be blocked. If a price (or 
other) chock to a fishery results in reallocation of other inputs than vessel time, then the shadow price of 
vessel time will not be affected. Further if marginal maintenance cost savings are insensitive to the 
amount of time allocated to maintenance (so that the shadow price is more or less constant) then 
production jointness may still be close to zero because time substitution is with maintenance – not other 
fisheries. Thus, in addition to a positive shadow price of vessel time, production jointness in this type of 
fishery requires that: 
1)  Time allocation to a fishery is responsive to price (or other) chocks to a fishery, and that  
2)  Marginal maintenance cost savings (the shadow price of vessel time) is responsive to 
changes in time allocation to maintenance. 
If these conditions hold (substantial) jointness may occur.  FOI Working Paper 2010/8   
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Thus the proposed theoretical model does not as such imply anything about the strength 
of production jointness – this is an empirical question. However, as we will see, the model does have 
important implications for how to specify a model for estimating production jointness. It is therefore 
critical to understand the underlying assumptions and discuss their applicability to the purse seiner 
fishery that we are modelling. 
  FOI Working Paper 2010/8   
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In the maximisation problem (9) we have no other binding constraints than the overall time constraint. 
Critical for this is the following assumption: 
  
Assumption 1: When ever fishing is optimal, maintenance is the best alternative application of vessel 
time. 
This assumption requires that profit rate curves of fisheries with overlapping seasons always intercept at 
a point in time where the common profit rate is bellow the marginal value of investing vessel time in 
maintenance. This implies that there will always be maintenance time between the time slots that it is 
optimal to allot to fisheries with overlapping seasons as illustrated in the top figure for fisheries A and 
B. This ensures that the only interaction between tasks is through the common shadow price of vessel 
time (i.e. that the only mechanism of jointness is the common shadow price of time provided by the 
maintenance alternative. If maintenance is the best alternative, then a chock to another fishery that does 
not affect the shadow price will not affect the other fisheries. 
The bottom figure illustrates a plausible situation where this assumption does not hold. 
The marginal profit curves of the two fisheries A and B with overlapping seasons intersect at a point 
with so high a profit rate that no time is allocated to maintenance between the time slots allocated to the 
two species. Here a chock to fishery A could affect fishery B even if the shadow price remains 
unchanged. Without a change in the shadow price, the stop time of fishery B is not affected, however, a 
shift in profitability of A could affect the start time of this fishery if the intersection of the two fisheries 
marginal cost curves (the point AB) is shifted, even though the shadow price remains unaffected. In this 
situation there is another mechanism for production jointness between these two specific fisheries so 
that another binding constraint is required in (9), and so our specification no longer applies. 
In conclusion, the model (9) is only applicable in this form if it is reasonable to assume 
that there is no seasonality of maintenance and if it is reasonable to assume that the time slots allocated 
for all individual species are ‘separated’ by maintenance time slots
4. 
 
                                                 
4 Clearly the theoretical model (9) is easily augmented to take account of such additional mechanisms of jointness. 
Two interacting fisheries can be described by a joint profit function conditional on allocated total vessel time to 
these two species. Then insert this into (9) in place of the two separable species profit functions. However, in this 
paper we use the simple specification (9)  FOI Working Paper 2010/8   
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3. Implications of the model 
In this section we derive a number of empirically testable implications of the model. We develop a 
constrained version of the fisherman’s maximisation problem that is useful for empirical applications 
and show that the same testable implications apply, and we also prove propositions that are useful for 
drawing conclusions about the unconstrained profit function from estimations based on the constrained 
problem. 
 
The specified theoretical model (9) has a number of implications that provide us with empirically 
testable parameter restrictions and aids the interpretation of results. 
The core result from the model is the first order conditions for profit maximum (10). 
These implicitly define allocated vessel time to each task  1,..., ,..., , iq m ddd d  as functions of market 
prices, quota constraints and the shadow price of time, i.e.: 
( , , )        where   for  1,...  and   for  1,...
            +   -  -                                                                                               
()
     
ii i ii ii
mm








                      
         -  
 (11) 
with the indicated partial derivative signs. If the time constraint is binding ( 0 λ > ), we have: 
1




dd w r λλ
=
+= ∑ %%      (12) 
which implicitly defines  0 λ >  as a function of market prices and quota constraints. Here derivatives of 
the shadow price λ  with respect to output price and constraint can be found by implicit differentiation: 
1







δ δ δλ δλ =
=− + > ∑      (13) 
This allows us to easily derive a number of useful implications. Differentiating (5) for i=1...h and using 
(11) and (13) to sign derivatives, we have that:  FOI Working Paper 2010/8   
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           +       +      -     +       
0
   where   for  1,..  and   for  1,..
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      ( 1 4 )  
with the indicated partial and total derivative signs. 
As we have noted above, maintenance costs  m C  may by highly responsive to allocated 
time (i.e. when fishing days are close to being quasi fixed). Thus capturing this interaction correctly 
when undertaking empirical modelling is important. However, sound estimates of depreciation and  
future maintenance expenditures due to postponed maintenance that are critical elements of 
maintenance costs ( m C ) are not available in many practical applications. On the other hand sound 
estimates of the total amount of fishing days input are often available. It may therefore be preferable to 
undertake empirical investigation of the constrained problem of allocating vessel time only among 









≤ ∑ % where  365 tot m dd =−  implying the constraint  mm dd = on 
maintenance time). This is in fact what we choose to do in the following empirical section and so it is 
useful to develop results for this problem also. 
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 indicates total derivatives in the constrained problem (15). Differentiating (5) for i=1...k and 
using (11) and (16) to sign derivatives we have that: 
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with the indicated partial derivative signs. The following propositions follow directly. 
 
Proposition 1: In both (9) and (15) all variable output derivatives with respect to other output prices and 










≤  for j=h+1....q 
 
Proof: Follows directly from (14) and (17) 
 
When the only mechanism of jointness is through changes in the shadow price of vessel time, a rise in 
time allocation to a fishery causing a rise in the shadow price must result in allocation reductions to all 
other fisheries (complementarity is ruled out)  
  FOI Working Paper 2010/8   
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Proposition 2: In both (9) and (15) for the derivatives of any two outputs i, j with respect to any two not 
overlapping prices or constraints k, ,l the following ratio equality applies  //
jj ii
ll kk
dy dy dy dy
dw dw dw dw
=  
where   or  kk kk wp wy ==  and   or  ll ll wp wy == , whichever applies. 
 
Proof: Follows directly when inserting from (14) and (17) 
 
Intuitively these regularities of output derivatives with respect to other outputs, result from all these 
interactions working through the allocatable input shadow price. Both propositions emit constraints 
implied by the assumed model that are easily empirically tested. 
When investigating the constrained problem, it is useful to know what implications can 
be drawn concerning the unconstrained problem. Here the following proposition and corollary are 
useful.  
 
Proposition 3: All variable output derivatives with respect to other output prices and constraints 
applying to a constrained problem (15) are numerically larger or numerically equal to the corresponding 
derivatives applying to the corresponding unconstrained problem (9). 
 












 for   or  ii ii wp wy ==  
which ever applies. Using this when comparing the relevant derivatives in (14) and (17) 
the propositions follow. 
 
Corollary to proposition 3: All variable output derivatives with respect to their own output price 
applying to a constrained problem are numerically smaller or numerically equal to the corresponding 
derivatives applying to the corresponding unconstrained problem.  FOI Working Paper 2010/8   














≤  when comparing the relevant derivatives in (14) and (17) 
the corollary follows. 
 
Corollary to proposition 3: If fishing days are in fact a quasi fixed ( / mm dC dd →∞), the solution to 
problem (9) approaches that of (15) so that the difference between the constrained and unconstrained 
solutions goes to zero. 
 
Proof: Since  / mm dC dd →∞ implies that  0
m d δ
δλ
→ , the corollary follows directly 
from (14) and (17). 
 
The intuition is that the optimal reduction in output caused by e.g. a price or quota increase for another 
input when the allocatable input is fixed, will be mediated when the allocatable input is allowed to be 
adjusted (upwards) in response to the price/quota rise because this mediates the initial rise in the 
shadow price of the allocatable input. In the same way the optimal increase in output from a rise in its 
price is greater in the unconstrained problem since time to maintenance here is also allowed to adjust 
downward, freeing more vessel time for reallocation. Finally, as these mediating affects approach zero 
so must the difference between the two problem solutions. 
  The important take-away point is that results from the estimations based on the 
constrained problem are ‘correct’ if fishing days are quasi fixed and that they overestimate cross effects 
and underestimate own price effect if fishing days are not quasi fixed. 
 
4. Description of empirical example and data  
In this section we describe the Norwegian purse seine fishery between 1992 and 1999 and the available 
data. 
The Norwegian purse seine fleet targets a number of different species (capelin, herring 
and mackerel) that are subject to individual (non-tradable) quota regulation. In addition a number of  FOI Working Paper 2010/8   
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unregulated species are targeted mainly Atlantic horse mackerel and sand eel distributed over the 
fishing season as well as over a large geographic area. Capelin is harvested in the Baltic Sea and at Jan 
Mayen during spring and autumn, spring-spawning herring is caught along the Norwegian coast during 
spring and autumn, and mackerel and North Sea herring are harvested in the North Sea during summer 
and autumn. The fishing seasons of the main species are illustrated in table 1    
 
Table 1 Fishing season for the Norwegian purse seiner fleet, by species, area, gear and 
month 
 
    month Jan    Feb March April may June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 





  X  X  X X           
Capelin  Iceland  PS            X  X   X   X        
BW
1)  Norwegian 
sea 
PT
5)         X X  X X X       
BW
1)  Atlantic PT X  X  X  X               
Mackerel Norway  PS                X  X  X     
Mackerel  North  sea  PS          X X X X X X  X  
NSH
2)  North  sea  PS          X X X X X X  X X 
SSH
3) Norway PS X  X  X              X  X  X 
 X indicates in what months and areas each species is fished. 
Source: Ekerhovd (2007) 
1) Blue whiting 
2) North Sea herring  
3) Spring-spawning herring 
4) Purse seine gear 
5) Pelagic trawl gear 
 
Initial econometric estimation reveals a singularity problem due multicollinearity between mackerel and 
North Sea herring. These species are harvested within the same geographical areas and under similar 
environmental conditions and quotas are determined under similar regulation principles. We there for 
use a Fisher index to aggregate the harvesting of North Sea herring and mackerel. In addition, the fisher 
index is used for aggregating the harvested of the unregulated species into a single output. 
We do not have data indicating the extent of idle harbour time nor the precise timing of 
each fishery nor the distribution of maintenance (in harbour) time. Thus we are not able to check 
directly if vessels are constrained in their fishing days input nor if species time slots are separated by 
periods of maintenance (as implied by assumptions 1). However, fishing seasons span the entire year 
and after aggregation of North Sea herring and mackerel no species have seasons that overlap both 
geographically and in time and so the assumptions do not seem unreasonable in our case.   FOI Working Paper 2010/8   
    
  19
  The individual non-transferable vessel quotas for regulated species are grandfathered on 
an annual basis
5. Generally allocated quotas are utilized and so our assumption of binding quota 
constraints seems reasonable.
6  
  Our panel dataset is provided by The Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries and Statistics 
Norway and consists 84 purse vessels with 250 annual observations in all between 1992 and 1999 (so 
an average of about 3 observations per vessel). Vessels are sampled randomly on annual basis (with 
participation varying between 26 and 40 vessels in the data period). Thus the panel is unbalanced with 
45 vessels participating 1 or 2 years, 23 vessels participating between 3 and 5 years, and 17 vessels 
participating more than 5 years. 
 
The data set contains annual landings in tons and sales revenue for each species for each vessel enabling 
us to calculate average output prices for each vessel. Costs for various input types for each vessel are 
also registered. Input price indexes are calculated using the relevant Statistics Norway price indices and 
assumed to apply for all vessels. In addition various indicators characterizing size etc. of each boat are 
available. The sample consists of 89 vessels having an average length of 50 meters and an average 
tonnage of 672 gross register tonnages (Table 1). Capacity costs (maintenance, insurance, depreciation 
etc.) on average account for about 39% of the total gross costs, the crews salary accounts for about 
39%
7, fuel expenditures account for about 9%), and vessel cost like ice, food account for another about 
9%.  
  Table 1 shows values and quantities of landings and costs for the sample of purse 
seiners.
8 The gross earnings (landing values) indicate that 31% in generated by spring spawning-
herring, 49% is obtained by the mackerel and herring harvested in the North Sea, capelin (9%) and 
unregulated species (10%).  
                                                 
5 However, permission has sometimes been given to sell quotas allotted to vessels being scrapped during the 
current season.  
6 This is based on communication with the Directorate Fisheries in Norway. 
7 The salary for the crew members  is typically a fixed share of the total landed value 
8 The purse seine vessels having individual quotas for blue whiting are not included in the sample  FOI Working Paper 2010/8   
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Table 1. Summary statistics of sample purse seines vessel 1992-1999  
Catch and vessel characteristics   Mean of all observations  Standard deviation 
89 Vessels, 250 Observations      
Fishing days  273.32  43.21 
Vessel tonnage (GRT)  672.78  253.60 
Length (Meters)  50.74  9.11 
Quantity of spring spawning herring  2609.4  1548.8 
Quantity of capelin  2023.1  2261.7 
Quantity of mackerel and North Sea herring  2191.9  878.0 
Quantity of unregulated species  1192.2  1343.8 
Value of spring spawning herring landings  4473.8  2823.0 
Value of capelin landings  1294.1  1324.1 
Value of mackerel/North Sea herring 
landings 
7047.0  2143.6 
Value of landings of unregulated species   1456.7 1476.8 
Vessel costs  1154.5 736.4 
Fuel costs   1044.9 431.4 
Source: The Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries and Statistics Norway. 
1) The quantities are in tons, prices in 1000 Norwegian kroner. 
2) The vessel cost is defined as cost for ice, bait, provisions and other unspecified costs. 
 
5. Estimation 
In this section we develop our empirical application based on the constrained problem (15). We 
estimate the input demand/ output supply system and present results which we compare with other 
studies of the Norwegian purse seine fishery for same time period. 
 
We only observe total profit, total fishing days input and totals of other inputs – not allocations to each 
fishery. For this reason we choose the normalized quadratic form because it has the advantage that the 
dual problem can be derived explicitly. 
We now introduce the normalized quadratic functional specification (with  n r  as the 
numeraire) of profit and cost functions for each species (see Kohli, 1993 for a classical fisheries 
application of this functional form): 
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where  i A  are matrices of parameters. We insert these quadratic specifications into (15) and derive total 
profit as the following function of total fishing days and prices of other inputs and outputs (See 
appendix for details): 
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The k subscripts in the parameter matrix A indicate coefficients in the linear part of the quadratic 
function, and the kk subscript indicates the constant. 
  For the normalized quadratic specification this is the aggregated profit function for a 
fishery with quota regulation for some outputs, where jointness is caused by the predetermined but 
allocatable input of total fishing days. The profit function in (19) is like a standard NQF, except that the 
total number of fishing days  tot d  is included as a fixed input. In addition it must satisfy the constraints 
implied by propositions 1 and 2 derived above. Finally, we can use proposition 3 and correlaries to 
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Applying the normalized quadratic functional form 
We have one unrestricted (aggregated) output and three quota restricted outputs (spring-spawning 
herring, capelin and the North Sea herring and mackerel aggregate). Capacity costs and maintenance go 
to producing the fishing days input on which we condition. The salary for the crew member is typically 
a fixed share of the total landed value and we assume that this cost element can be treated as part of 
profit (i.e. that fishing is in effect a joint venture project). Thus we assume that output of each fishery is 
produced using fishing days, fuel and vessel costs (with the underlying skipper and crew input, reaping 
residual profit) where we use vessel cost as the numeraire input. 
From the profit function (19) we derive the systems of supply and demand functions to 
be estimated. The supply function for the unregulated output is found by differentiation (19):   
11 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
11 2 1 2 2 2
2 1
(/ ) () ( / ) ( / )
q
j
yk yd tot yy yy j yr yr
j
d
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The demand function for fuel input becomes: 
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and so, the corresponding unit price of vessel costs is used for normalization. A number of parameters 
enter several equations of the system, and in addition we have the usual symmetry restrictions (here 
only one 
11 11
yr ry aa = ). The regressors include prices of variable inputs and outputs, the fixed quantities of 
quoted regulated species (spring-spawning herring, capelin and the North Sea herring and mackerel 
aggregate) and the allocatable total input of fishing days.  FOI Working Paper 2010/8   
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We assume that coefficients are homogenous across vessels except for the fixed effects 
in each equation. However, we assume that variation in fixed effects between vessels is proportional to 
vessel tonnage (i.e. we estimate with a homogenous constant term but include vessel tonnage as an 
explanatory variable to capture this in all equations). In addition, the annual stock fluctuations of 
unregulated species may affect the harvest and as control for this we have included annual dummies 
into each model equation (20)-(22). 
 
Selection and endogeneity issues 
If panel participation was endogenous, we would have a potential selection bias problem. However, the 
panel participants are randomly selected by the Norwegian Fisheries Directorate following procedures 
developed by Statistics Norway and there is virtually no attrition (fishermen that do not report when 
selected to the panel) because the reported variables are a mandatory part of the Norwegian fisheries 
regulation system. 
The main endogeneity issue here arises because, the system (20) to (22) is estimated 
conditional on fishing days and using imputed prices. The total number of fishing days may be decided 
on as an integrated part of the fisherman’s short-run problem and so this variable is potentially 
endogenous and should be instrumented. We use ‘vessel age’ as an instrument (since required 
maintenance and thereby maintenance time presumably correlates with vessel age whereas there is no 
reason to suspect that vessel age should be affected by, e.g., the relative input and output price 
fluctuations that generate fishing day endogeneity). Technically we use three stages least squares 
estimation (3SLS). With only one instrument we cannot test instrument validity, but significance of the 
instrumental estimation is checked with a Hausman test (comparing 3SLS estimates with SUR estimates 
of the same system) showing that there is no significant difference between the SUR and 3SLS.
9 
Unfortunately this is because our instrument is weak.
10 As emphasized by Bound, Jaeger and Baker 
(1995), use of weak instruments may in itself result in biased estimates so we have settled on our SUR 
                                                 
9 The Hausman test statistics is 8.26 so that significance of instrumentation is just rejected (the critical value chi-
square (4) 5% value is 9.488).  
 
10 We have tried to include regional dummies and vessel length in the instrument set without a significant increase 
in instrument strength. We have also tried using lagged variables as instruments but this critically reduced our 
unbalanced panel.  FOI Working Paper 2010/8   
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estimation as the result that we are most comfortable with. However, the fact that the limited 
information contained in our data prevents a proper instrumentation of fishing days is worrying. 
 
Estimation and results 
The estimated parameters from the restricted SUR estimation of the system (20) – (22) are presented in 
Table 2. The model clearly significant and captures a large part of the variation in left hand variables 
(with R
2 values for unrestricted output, fuel input and vessel input are respectively 0.510, 0.945 and 
0.784). Four cross equation restrictions implied by the theoretical system (symmetry and parameter 
equality involving
11 11 11 ,, yy rr yr aaa ) have been accepted and imposed on the unrestricted system
11. Since we 
just have one unregulated species, only the implication of proposition 1 (that all cross effects are non-
positive) can be tested in our case. A Wald test of jointly restricting all three effects to zero is clearly 
accepted (see table 5) and none are significantly positive and so, according to this test, our estimations 
are consistent with the assumed model. 
                                                 
11 The Wald test of imposing all four restrictions is clearly accepted with the test statistics of 3.87 substantially 
below the critical 5% χ
2(4)-value of 9.488.  FOI Working Paper 2010/8   
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Table 2. Estimated parameter values for model with allocatable input jointness 
1) 
Parameter Coeff.  t-value    Parameter  Coef.  t-value 
Unres. output       Vessel Input      
11
yy a   433.963 1.54  -(
22
kd dr aa + )  0.595 0.76 
11
yr a   -156.119 -3.68  -½ dd a   -0.002 -1.17 
1
yd a   9.122 3.28  -½
11
yy a   -216.981 -1.54 
12
yy a   0.499 1.81  22
yy a   4.79*10
-7  0.05 
13
yy a   0.300 0.41  23
yy a   7.59*10
-5  -1.95 
14
yy a   -0.094 -0.63 24
yy a   6.86*10
-6  0.79 
βy -0.880  -1.09  33
yy a   5.57*10
-5 1.04 
     34
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yy a   6.06*10
-6 1.41 
11
ry a   -156.11 -3.68  -
11
yr a   156.119 3.68 
11
rr a   295.48 3.33  -½
11
rr a   -147.742 -3.33 
1
rd a   -0.80 -4.31  βx2  -0.179 -1.89 
12
ry a   0.008 0.58       
13
ry a   -0.08 -1.75       
14
ry a   -0.015 -1.90       
βx1 -0.381  -8.37       
1) Parameter values for the annual dummies are not included in table 2. Coefficients to βy, βx1, β x2 reflect the 
variation in fixed effects between vessels assumed to be proportional to vessel tonnage (TE), i.e. we include vessel 




In table 3 we show derived own- and cross-prise elasticities with respect to inputs and unrestricted 
output. Own price elasticities of fuel and vessel inputs are significant and have the expected negative 
relationships, though numerically smaller than one. The estimated own price elasticity of output is small 
and insignificant. This is not surprising since these vessels typically focus their efforts on high value 
quoted species and therefore are less responsive to price changes in unregulated low valued species. 
The cross price elasticities between inputs are also significant with the positive sign implying that the 
inputs are gross substitutes. The cross-prise elasticities between unrestricted output and inputs have the 
expected signs but only elasticities with respect to fuel are significant. 
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Table 3. Own and cross price elasticities of input and outputs
1) 
 Quantity 
Prices Output  Fuel  Vessel  input 
Output  0.061 0.125** 0.026 
  (0.041) (0.034) (0.079) 
Fuel -0.079**  -0.795**  0.579** 
  (0.022) (0.239) (0.202) 
Vessel input  0.019  0.671**  -0.605** 
  (0.040) (0.234) (0.228) 
** Significant at 5% level.  
The parentheses contain the standard errors on the estimates. 
 
 
Several other studies have estimated models for the Norwegian purse fleet using more or less the same 
data. Asche, Gordon and Jensen (2007) estimating a normalized quadratic profit function find an 
insignificant own price elasticity for the harvest of unregulated output.
12 Nøstbakken (2006), Bjørndal 
and Gordon (2000) estimating a cost function for the Norwegian purse fleet find small elasticities for 
inputs.
13 Weninger also reports inelastic- input price response for purse seiner fishery operating in the 
surf clam and ocean quahog fishery.
14 When comparing with our results, it is important to remember 
that our elasticities are conditional on fixed input of fishing days while all the above cited studies allow 
adjustments of input of fishing days. We know from the corollary to proposition 3 that conditional 
output own-price elasticities are numerically smaller then unconditional elasticities. Given this and 
other differences in model structure and data, the basic behavioural reactions implied by the estimated 
allocatable input model seem reasonable and generally consistent with other comparable studies. 
Of primary interest here is how the shift in structural model (from the standard jointness 
structure, usually applied to the jointness structure using the fixed but allocatable input we have 
developed) affects parameter estimates indicating production jointness. For this we compare the model 
                                                 
12 Asche, Gordon and Jensen (AGJ) estimate a symmetric quadratic profit function on Norwegian purse seiners. 
Similar to the purse seine vessels addressed in the present study. The specification in AGJ is includes unrestricted 
output, operating cost including fuel, wages, insurance, bait and other variables cost expressed as the operating 
cost per fishing day. In AGJ the elasticity on unrestricted output is insignificant, and the elasticity on operating 
cost is small (-0.12) but significant. In this study we find similar to AGJ and insignificant elasticity on unregulated 
output, and the elasticities on fuel (-0.795) and vessel input (-0.605) are statistical significant.    
13 Bjørndal and Gordon (2000), Nøstbakken (2006) are estimating translog cost function for the Norwegian purse 
seine fleet. They studies are applying data on the same fleet as addressed in present study, which is based on the 
period 1994-1996 in Bjørndal and Gordon and 1998-2000 in Nøstbakken. The input elasticity on fuel is -0.046 in 
Nøstbakken and -0.18 in Bjørndal, moreover is reported elasticity on vessel input, which incorporates insurance, 
maintenance, bait and other cost.  
14 Weninger (1998) is estimating a translog cost function for the Mid-Atlantic surf clam and quahog fishery in 
United States.  The input elasticities on fuel is 0.28, moreover is found an elasticity on 0.72 for fishing gear.   FOI Working Paper 2010/8   
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we have estimated with a corresponding ‘standard’ normalized quadratic multi-output model (the only 
difference being that the number of fishing days is dropped as a regressor).
15 Table 4 presents 
elasticities of intensity expressing the per-cent effect on inputs and the unrestricted output of a 1% 
increase in restricted outputs and fixed fishing days inputs for both models. Table 5 presents Wald tests 
of jointly restricting various sets of these effects to zero in both models. 
 
Table 4. Elasticity with respect to restricted outputs and fishing days (N)
1) 
Quantity   Output  Fuel  Vessel  input 
Model with allocatable input jointness: 
Fixed input 
Fishing days included 
Fishing days   1.295**  0.592**  0.032 
  (0.395) (0.137) (0.237) 
      
   
Regulated  outputs     
Spring-spawning herring  0.735*  -0.066  0.464** 
  (0.421) (0.114) (0.168) 
North Sea herring and mackerel
  0.206 0.292*  0.592* 
  (0.519) (0.167) (0.344) 
Capelin -0.0952  0.065*  0.174 
  (0.152) (0.034) (0.143) 
      
Model with standard jointness: 
 
Fishing days not included 
Regulated outputs     
Spring-spawning herring  0.311  -0.127  0.428** 
  (0.387) (0.136) (0.173) 
North Sea herring and mackerel
  1.149** 0.412** 0.677** 
  (0.421) (0.198) (0.347) 
Capelin -0.003  0.079  0.235 
  (0.148) (0.042) (0.145) 
** Significant at 5% level. * Significant at 10% level. 
1) The parentheses contain the standard errors on the estimates. 
 
The first four rows show intensity elasticities implied by the allocatable input jointness structure while 
the following three rows show corresponding elasticities implied by the standard jointness structure. 
The first row shows intensity elasticities with respect to fishing days where we see a 
substantial positive and significant effect on unrestricted output and fuel input which is as expected – 
but there is a curiously small and insignificant effect on vessel input. The Wald test of jointly restricting 
                                                 
15 The estimated parameters for the translog system without the number of fishing days are presented in table 2A 
in the Annex.  FOI Working Paper 2010/8   
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these effects to zero is clearly rejected (see table 5). The next three rows show intensity elasticities with 
respect to restricted outputs. We see that increasing the constrained outputs generally has the expected 
positive effect on input use (where one elasticity is significant at the 5% level and three others are 
significant at the 10% level). The Wald test of jointly restricting these effects to zero is also clearly 
rejected (see table 5). 
Our main interest is the intensity elasticities with respect to the unrestricted output in the 
first column where we see that the allocatable input jointness structure implies insignificant effects. A 
Wald test of jointly restricting all three effects to zero is clearly accepted (see table 5). We know from 
proposition 1 that our theoretical model implies that these effects are non-positive so on this point our 
estimations are (as already noted) consistent with the assumed model. Given our model, this suggests 
that effects are close to zero. We further know from proposition 3 that corresponding unrestricted 
elasticities (where fishing days are allowed to adjust) are numerically smaller (or equal to) the estimated 
elasticities conditional on fixed fishing days input. Thus, our results imply that the Norwegian purse 
seiner fleet is not characterised by production jointness. 
Turning to the effects implied by the standard jointness structure in the next 3 rows we 
see the same pattern of effects on inputs with elasticities that tend generally to be larger – as we would 
expect since this model allows adjustment of fishing days input. The corresponding Wald test of jointly 
restricting to zero is also clearly rejected (see table 5). However, the pattern of effects on the 
unrestricted output is substantially different. Estimating with the standard jointness structure implies 
significant spill over effects between restricted and unrestricted species and complementarity 
relationship between unrestricted output and North Sea herring and mackerel. The corresponding Wald 
test of jointly restricting affects to zero is clearly rejected (see table 5) in contrast to acceptance under 
the standard jointness structure. 
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Table 5. Wald test of joint hypothesis for purse seine vessels 
 






  Allocatable input jointness (Fishing days included)
Zero effect of fishing days on 
unrestricted output and inputs  
25.67 9.488  4  Reject  null 
Zero effect of restricted output 
on unrestricted input  
29.33 16.92  9  Reject  null 
Zero effect of restricted output 
on unrestricted output  
4.38 7.815  3  Cannot  reject 
null 
  Standard jointness (Fishing days not included)
        
Zero effect of restricted output 
on unrestricted input  
36.50 16.92  9  Reject  null 
Zero effect of restricted output 
on unrestricted output  
18.18 7.815  3  Reject  null 




Thus it seems that the main effect of changing the jointness structure of the model is that the implied 
production jointness with a standard structure disappears when the allocatable input structure is used. 
The effects of this model change on other elasticities are less significant. Comparing this with the 
literature, our result contrasts earlier findings in the Norwegian purse seine fishery by Asche, Gordon 
and Jensen (2007) and Ekerhovd (2007) who find evidence of substantial spill over effects between 
restricted and unrestricted species. These studies use the ‘standard’ jointness structure and our results 
suggest that this may explain why our results differ. Thus when we model jointness in what we have 
argued to be the structurally correct way, the effect disappears. 
  FOI Working Paper 2010/8   
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6. Conclusion 
The main contribution of this paper is that we develop a structural model of the mechanism casing 
jointness between the different basically separable fisheries undertaken by a purse seine net fishery. In 
this model production jointness between different fisheries can only be through the mechanism of 
allocating fishing day input. If the vessel has idle time in harbour (not used for maintenance, rigging, 
etc.) then input of fishing days is not restricted. In this case there is no output jointness because fishing 
day input to a given fishery can be increased without reducing input to other fisheries by reducing idle 
harbour time. If, on the other hand, there is no idle harbour time so that all vessel time is allocated to 
either fishing or maintenance, etc., jointness may occur. If a price (or other) chock to a fishery results in 
a change in allocation of vessel time to this fishery then the shadow price of vessel time will be 
affected. If in addition, time allocation to maintenance is unresponsive to changes in the shadow price 
(i.e. if fishing days are close to being a quasi fixed input) then this reallocation will affect fishing days 
allocation to other fisheries causing production jointness.  This foundation provides a framework for 
understanding and empirically modelling the interactions between different fisheries undertaken by 
such an industry.    
We derive a number of implications that can be used to test and interpret empirical 
applications based on the model. Assuming the normalized quadratic form, we estimate a model based 
on this set up for the Norwegian purse seine fishery and find that it implies non-jointness which 
contrasts the findings of prior studies of this fishery, using the standard multi-input multi-output profit 
function forms. Since the endogeneity issues in connection with our estimation are not optimally 
resolved, this outcome should be interpreted with caution. However, it does illustrate the potential 
practical importance of modelling the underlying jointness in the way we suggest. 
  The structural model of jointness we propose may also have different implications for the 
design of regulation schemes than do standard multi species models. This could be an interesting 
direction for future research. 
  FOI Working Paper 2010/8   
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The k subscripts indicate coefficients in the linear part of the quadratic function and the 
kk subscript indicates the constant.  
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where  12 ... q ww w w ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦ and  12 ... q dd d d ⎡ ⎤ = ⎣ ⎦ and the last equation (the sum restriction) 
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giving the matrix equation covering all q equations: 
// 0 tot n n Ad bd Bw r Cr r α ++ + + = % %% % %      (A5) 
 
 
Solving for d gives  
1(/ / ) / / tot n n tot n n d A bd Bw r Cr r bd Bw r Cr r ββ
− =+ ++ = + ++ % %% % %  (A6) 
Inserting (A6) in (A1) we have: 
1
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which like above by factoring out and collecting terms gives: 
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where  i A %  is symmetric. Adding over outputs and defining     i A A =∑ % (which then is also symmetric) 
we have: 
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This is the aggregated profit function in (16)  FOI Working Paper 2010/8   
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Appendix B 
Table 2A. The estimated parameter values from the translog system without including 
fishing days
1) 
Parameter Coeff.  t-value    Parameter  Coef.  t-value 
Unres. output       Vessel Input     
11
yy a   739.281 2.75  22
kd dr aa +     
11
yr a   -191.684 -3.72 -½ dd a     
1
yd a      -½
11
yy a   -369.640 -2.75 
12
yy a   0.213 0.80 22
yy a   3.68*10
-6  -0.38 
13
yy a   1.684 2.73 23
yy a   6.15*10
-5  -1.56 
14
yy a   -0.003 -0.02 24
yy a   9.83*10
-6  1.10 
βy -1.363  -1.68  33
yy a   5.05*10
-5 0.90 
     34
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yy a   8.70*10
-6 1.98 
11
ry a   -191.684 -3.72 -
11
yr a   191.684 3.72 
11
rr a   119.500 3.33  -½
11
rr a   -59.750 -1.32 
1
rd a      βx2 -0.187  -1.89 
12
ry a   0.017 0.93       
13
ry a   -0.117 -2.08       
14
ry a   -0.018 -1.88       
βx1 -0.374  -6.74       
1)  The parameter values for the annual dummies are not included in the Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 